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Abstract 
In this response to Matusov's "Right for Freedom in Education," I will offer two “yes, but…” concerns about crucial 
complexities of this freedom that I think Matusov leaves unaddressed, and a “yes, and…” alternative pragmatic 
justification of this freedom that differs from, but I think is more compelling than, Matusov’s. 
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ÏÏÒ 
In “A Right for Freedom of Education,” Eugene Matusov lays out a case “that students must have 
to freely define their own education.” He lays out four types of education (training, closed socialization, open 
socialization, and critical examination), and argues why students’ rights to define how, whether, and when 
to engage in these forms are necessary for true education in each form. He then argues against several 
foreseeable objections.  
At the outset, I must say that I am sympathetic to Matusov’s overall case; I believe that students, 
as much as possible, should have the freedom to define their educational trajectory. I will offer here two 
“yes, but…” concerns about crucial complexities of this freedom that I think Matusov leaves unaddressed, 
and a “yes, and…” alternative pragmatic justification of this freedom that differs from, but I think is more 
compelling than, Matusov’s. 
“Yes, but…” 1: What is a Student? 
As detailed as Matusov’s defense is of students’ rights to educational freedom (RoEF), he does not 
seek to lay out what we do and don’t mean by “student.’ We shouldn’t expect authors to define each term 
used in their argument with full precision. Yet, in this case, the lack of definition is crucial. Saying that all 
adults have the right to enter into contracts means nothing without a delineation of what an adult is, and 
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similarity, we cannot make sense of what it means for students to have an RoEF without knowing who is 
and isn’t a student.  
As I write this, my family has an infant foster-daughter in the house. Regularly, we violate her RoEF 
by forcing her into “tummy time;” we put her onto her stomach so that she can strengthen muscles 
necessary for crawling and gain necessary practice being on her stomach. Her forceful cries during this 
process tell us that this educational experience (we’ve tried in vain to explain to her that it is an “opportunity”) 
is entirely against her will. The question is whether she is a student in Matusov’s relevant sense. Certainly, 
she is a learner. (Arguably, infants are tremendous learners.) But is it possible that not all learners qualify 
as the type of students who should have an RoEF? Moreover, if Matusov persuades me that she is indeed 
a student with an RoEF, I would still likely not follow his advice, leaving her entirely free of unasked-for 
intervention. The law would (rightly) call that child neglect. 
I suspect that for Matusov’s case to work - and to explain why our infant is a learner but not an 
RoEF-entitled student - we need to define “student” by appealing to the capabilities we (parents? society? 
government?) believe are prerequisite to the ability to exercise these rights. To have a sensible idea of a 
right to free contract, for example, we must imagine that the rights-bearers can likely do the things 
necessary to exercise the right: read written contracts, understand and entertain contractual terms, have 
the self-restraint to bind themselves to the terms of the contract in the future, etc. Otherwise, allowing the 
right to free contract to those manifestly without the capabilities for its exercise would be, at best, 
meaningless and, at worst, a right to be swindled, exploited, or unaided. 
I think a similar thing applies here. There is disagreement over what cognitive powers infants have 
(and how developed they are), but we can certainly say that infants cannot do a multitude of things that are 
likely necessary to effectively exercise an RoEF - communicate anything more complex than a cry, identify 
anything beyond the most simple interests, use their bodies to act on (let alone imagine how to act on) 
these interests, etc. The questions Matusov needs to address are what capabilities are required for learners 
to benefit from an RoEF, and how to use that set of capabilities to delineate who are and aren’t students 
entitled to an RoEF. 
When Matusov gives examples of students exercising the right to education, in fact, he does so 
exclusively by reference to undergraduate students who presumably have the capabilities that would need 
to preexist for exercise of educational rights. He describes how his own college students use their freedom 
to navigate his college level course, a course that provides them much guided choice. Yet, we can assume 
that most of these students went through a coerced system of k-12 education Matusov rejects. An 
interesting upshot of his case is that, if it true, as he says early in the paper, that “education requires 
freedom” - that coercion rules out actual education - Matusov would have to argue the questionable position 
that these 18+ year-olds are little more educated than my infant foster-daughter. 
“Yes, but…” 2: The Justification is Unclear 
Early in the article, Matusov writes: “My justification for the thesis is existential rather than pragmatic 
or liberty-based. I am not going to argue here that students’ freedom of education will pragmatically improve 
educational outcomes, although it might be often true.” Nor is he making an argument that some conception 
of liberal rights demands that students have an RoEF. “In contrast, I argue here that students’ right to 
freedom of education is the essence of education itself. In other words, I argue that education requires 
freedom. Education requires students to define their own education.” 
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There are two difficulties with this justification. The first is that as an empirical matter, it is untrue. 
I’ve heard and read stories from many people who recall having benefited educationally from learning paths 
they were forced to march. Matusov himself writes of an experience that disproves his justification when he 
recalls being coerced to learn English in the Soviet Union. He writes that he did not enjoy learning English 
in this way and that he did not learn it as effectively as his wife, who learned English without coercion. But 
it does seem - Matusov does not say otherwise - that he did in fact learn the English, and this must mean 
that education did not in that case require freedom.1  
The second problem with his existential justification is that throughout the paper, he seems 
exclusively to rely on the pragmatic justification he says he is not making (and without that pragmatic 
justification, his argument would be less convincing.) For instance, when justifying why a right to educational 
freedom is justified in cases of “open socialization” (learning socialization into situations where rules are ill-
defined or negotiable, like learning to converse) he writes that open socialization requires creativity, and 
creativity requires freedom: 
Creativity is out-of-box thinking, feeling, relating, talking, imaging, and acting. It involves a student’s 
transcendence of the given – mostly the socially and culturally given on the macro or micro scales–recognized 
and appreciated by other and/or the student themselves. Creativity and, thus, open socialization require the 
student’s freedom to define what creativity and open socialization are, – hence, their own education (p. SF7).2 
Similarly, in justifying why this freedom is required for “critical examination,” Matusov writes that for 
critical examination to take place, it “cannot not be assigned by the others, but only self-assigned.” For me 
to critically examine something, the question being examined must be mine rather than one imposed on 
me.3  
Even if we agree with both justifications, the problem is that they are irreducibly pragmatic, 
outcome-focused. The arguments both say that for education in x to be possible or of good quality, the best 
outcomes will come through route y (freedom), and hence, the goodness of y route is largely or wholly tied 
to how well it can bring about x. Suppose we agree with Matusov that learning for “open socialization” 
requires creativity and that the justification for student RoEF here is that freedom allows for and leads to 
creativity. We can at least imagine a situation where we leave students free in “open socialization” learning 
but witness no resulting creativity. Based on Matusov’s justification above, it would be hard to argue that 
the value of freedom does not depend on it leading to the result of creativity.  
That Matusov generally relies on pragmatic arguments for student freedom is important. Why? 
Because even though Matusov seems to want to couch this right to freedom in outcome-neutral language, 
it is an impossible task. All attempts to say what education is and what conditions are required for it - let 
 
1 Matusov could retort that he was trained, not educated, in English. To do that, though, I suspect he would have to invoke an definition 
of “education” that bakes freedom as a necessary condition into the definition itself, thus making his point trivially true: “If we define 
education so that any ‘education’ where the learner isn’t free doesn’t count, it will be, by definition, that education requires freedom!” 
2 It should also be noted that the sentences in this passage problematically contradict each other. The first and second define what 
creativity is and the third argues that what creativity is must be defined by the student. This is problematic as it leaves open the 
question of how we, in fact, know whether students learning “open socialization” in freedom are in fact doing so creatively, which 
Matusov argues is necessary for such learning. 
3 This idea is arguably false because it contains a false choice between “self-assigned examination that will be felt by the inquirer as 
a question work critically examining” and “other-assigned examination that can’t be felt by the inquirer as a question worth critically 
examining.” The missing third option - the reason education need not require freedom - is “Other-assigned examination that the 
assignee comes to be interested in enough to reflect on.” It may be more likely that self-assigned questions will be the most interesting 
to the inquirer, but it is possible that other-assigned - even imposed - questions can come to the inquirer to be worth examining and 
appropriated AS IF it were self-assigned. 
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alone differentiating, as he does, legitimate from illegitimate educational paths - demand the use of 
outcome-focused thinking. If the goal of education is to allow for student flourishing, for instance, we have 
to have some guiding idea of what flourishing does and doesn’t look like (otherwise, we could not be able 
to tell that any method of education seems superior or inferior to another). One can be comparatively strict 
or loose, inelastic or elastic, monistic or plural in what one thinks the outcomes of education should be (and 
I recommend loose, elastic, and plural), but all arguments for how education should proceed - even 
Matusov’s - will unavoidably be hitched to its ability to produce some specifiable outcomes. 
“Yes… and” 3: A Different Grounding 
To conclude, I will offer an alternative vision of how to ground students’ RoEF, one I think is more 
plausible and realistic than Matusov’s.  
I join Matusov in embracing a (Berlinian) value pluralist conception of what the legitimate outcomes 
of education should be: people can and should be able to live many different kinds of lives, and education 
should allow for a wide plurality of different paths for students. (Yet, I also agree with Matusov that there 
must be limitations on what types of educational paths should be off-limits as “illegitimate,” though I think 
this admission is less a problem for my justification than Matusov’s.)  
Instead of suggesting that education can only take place with the necessary condition of freedom 
- clearly false, as I’ve argued - I argue that epistemically, it is advisable to allow decisions about education 
to be made by (a) those who have the most stake in the result and (b) the most local or personal knowledge 
that should bear on the decision. That is, the child is generally (a) the one who is primarily affected by her 
education and (b) generally has the most knowledge about what learning and methods she will find most 
engaging and useful. A good summary of this type of liberal approach comes from economist and 
philosopher Friedrich Hayek: “The true basis of his [the liberal’s] argument is that nobody can know who 
knows best and that the only way by which we can find out is through a social process in which everybody 
is allowed to try and see what he can do.” (Hayek, 1948, p. 15). Philosopher John Lachs summarizes the 
point similarly: “For the most part, being oneself, day and night gives one a privileged view of what satisfies; 
there is little basis for substituting the judgment of others for our long experience and considered opinions” 
(Lachs, 2014, p. 9). 
One could, of course, argue that experienced adults are more likely to know what students will 
need in the future, and that this suffices to justify supplanting student judgement with force by adults. A 
necessary component to my modified argument, then, is the idea that it is quite feasible for students, as 
they grow, to identify and learn need-to-know things as they need them. In other words, leaving them free 
from educational coercion allows students to use their capabilities to learn what they need when they need, 
or discover an interest in, the learning. Literature on this approach is growing, confirming its viability as a 
way to prepare children into adulthood (Greenberg & Sadofsky, 1992; Llewellyn, 2005; Riley & Gray, 2015; 
Thomas & Pattison, 2008). 
Articulating the details and parameters of my epistemically pragmatic justification is beyond the 
scope of this reply, but I think it improves on Matusov’s justification. First, it unabashedly places the freedom 
from coercion on pragmatic grounds: freedom works because it will likely yield better results for learners 
than coercion because it allows the individuals who have the most “skin in the game” to operate on the 
knowledge they possess about themselves that others can’t or likely won’t have. This pragmatic justification 
need not rely on the false idea that freedom is a necessary condition for education, but only acknowledges 
that while others may indeed know what is best for us at times, it is more likely in any given case that they 
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do not. That some look back on imprisonment as a positive transformative experience does not justify 
mandatory imprisonment for everyone. That some have retrospectively profited from a forced education 
does not invalidate the idea that freedom is still the best policy. With my epistemically pragmatic justification, 
an RoEF is justified because it puts the educational decisions in the hands of those we should suppose on 
balance are in the best position to make them. (More experienced adults or educational experts can surely 
consult and advise, but the decision itself should be placed with the student herself, as long as we have 
reason to think she has the capabilities necessary to use her RoEF.)  
Lastly, because my justification is pragmatic, it can and should be sensitive to rights’ dependency 
on capabilities. The reason why I can coerce my infant into “tummy time” is because our best knowledge 
of infants tells us that she does not have the capabilities necessary to appraise what she will need to know, 
the bodily ability to act on her interests (or think through how to do so, or enlist others to aid her beyond the 
most basic cries for help), etc. The older she gets or the more she can demonstrate to concerned parties 
that she is increasingly capable of such things, the easier it is to justify this pragmatically-grounded 
approach to freedom. 
One can, of course, object that because this freedom is pragmatically grounded, it is less secure 
and potentially “up to” the judgment of others besides the student. (“You use your freedom to choose 
unwisely in my judgment, and therefore, I will not let you choose anymore.”) My pragmatic grounding does 
leave freedom vulnerable. Yet, no philosophy can make freedom invulnerable, and arguably, my pragmatic 
justification leaves the RoEF vulnerable at the opportunity of making it feasible and worth having. If we 
imagined a world where students have an RoEF, where the freedom persistently left people ill-equipped for 
and/or unhappy with life, Matusov would have to continue advocating for the RoEF because results don’t 
affect the validity of the right. I, the pragmatist, would concern myself with flourishing and happiness first, 
and reappraise the “shape” of the RoEF accordingly.  
It might also be true that my pragmatic justification for an RoEF leaves this freedom vulnerable to 
the judgment of whoever is in a position to grant and rescind it. Yet, so does Matusov’s! Matusov leaves it 
entirely to these people - not the learner - to decide such things as what educational paths are legitimate 
or not, for instance. If there is a concern that my theory provides grounds for illiberal folks to rescind student 
rights to freedom on paternalistic grounds, we can easily imagine those illiberal folks could do the same if 
granted by Matusov the power to determine what education are legitimate and not. That these rights are 
vulnerable to paternalistic rescindment is not a problem philosophy can solve. The only thing that can 
prevent the problem is that whoever is in a position to rescind or grant the RoEF is of a certain liberal 
temperament and interprets whatever justifies the right in a liberal way. 
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